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RESPECT AND THE MENGZIAN CONCEPTION OF YI
AS A RULE-RELATED VIRTUE
MENG ZHANG

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Meng Zi’s idea of yi (義) as a virtue. In it, I first briefly
examine two influential interpretations of yi – the “appropriateness” approach that views yi
as a disposition to do what is fitting in a given situation and the shame-centered approach that
understands yi as a disposition to avoid what is shameful in the moral life. The first approach
is too thin to distinguish yi from acting properly in general and the second reading confines
the definitive feeling involved in yi to a too moralized understanding of shame. Moreover, both
fail to pay enough attention to the reliance of yi on social norms to receive its content. Through
textual analysis, I show that in addition to a sense of shame, respect as an attitude of
prioritizing other persons in the way specified by the relevant norms also serves as an
important emotional core of yi as a virtue. In the end, I highlight the potential contribution of
the Mengzian idea of yi to virtue ethics. The two-faceted structure of yi points to a way to
account for rule-related virtues – virtues that have rule-conformity as a component. Equipped
with thick descriptions of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics will be in a better position to guide
actions.
Keywords: yi, Meng Zi, respect, virtue ethics

This paper examines the virtue of yi (“righteousness”, “justice”, “appropriateness”,
“rightness”, or “integrity”) 1 in the text of Meng-Zi. 2 I argue that the current
interpretations of this virtue get only part of the truth and neglect an important feature
of it: its reliance on a social scheme to receive content. Partly because Meng Zi (孟子)
is frequently discussed in contrast to Xun Zi (荀子) who emphasizes the rule-following
aspect of ethical life, his insight about social norms and how they relate to virtue is
ignored. My account of yi highlights that aspect of his thought. Besides, a set of
respectful sentiments – sentiments that involve giving priority to the significance
of others by serving them – plays an important role in the motivational structure of yi.
________________________
ZHANG, MENG: Indiana University at Bloomington, USA. Email: zhang319@iu.edu
1

Due to the multi-dimensionality of yi, I keep this term untranslated.
All translations of the text are from Bryan W. Van Norden (trans.), Mengzi with Selections from
Traditional Commentaries.
2
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Backed up by a rich psychological account, Mengzian yi incorporates the normative
force of social norms without reducing itself to mere rule-abidingness. In the
conclusion, I suggest one potential contribution of Meng Zi’s account of yi to
contemporary virtue ethics: it points to a way to conceptualize virtues that have ruleconformity as a component – which I call “rule-related virtues”. Equipped with full
analyses of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics can guide actions more easily without
giving up its central commitment to making moral evaluations in terms of the inner
state of the agent. I want to emphasize that this paper focuses on Meng Zi; I am open
to the possibility that other Confucian thinkers understand yi differently.
1. THE PROBLEM OF YI IN THE MENG-ZI
In this section, I identify two influential approaches to understand yi. Both capture part
of the truth but are vulnerable to interpretative and philosophical problems.
One common way to interpret yi in traditional commentaries and contemporary
scholarship is to understand it as “appropriateness (yi 宜)”.3 For example, Roger Ames
holds that yi “is an achieved sense of appropriateness that enables one to act in a proper
and fitting manner, given the specifics of a situation” (Ames 2011, 205). Following
Ames, James Behuniak understands yi as “a social sensibility that enables one to
behave in a fitting manner” (Benuniak 2005, xxvi). As a characterization of one aspect
of yi, such claims are unproblematic, but as a full analysis, this account is inadequate
since it over-expands the scope of the virtue of yi. Think of a case in which a civilian
thrown into the battlefield escapes out of fear. Suppose that she feels the right amount
of fear and reacts to it correctly (here, to escape). What she does is appropriate, but the
virtues shown by her action are prudence, alertness, and self-control (by not being panic)
instead of yi as Meng Zi understands it. In other words, “appropriateness”, standing
alone, is too thin to capture what is definitive about yi. To be yi is certainly to be
responsive to features of the context. But Meng Zi also claims yi to be internal to human
nature (6A4, 6A5), that is, yi is also a manifestation of some inner quality of the agent.4
Characterizing the content of yi solely by referring to contextual factors, this account
overlooks the rich materials about the psychological constitution of a yi person in the
text.5
3

See Zhu Xi (1933, 28), Jiao Xun (2015, 754), and Cheng (1972, 276).
Behuniak (2015, 38) and Chong (2002, 103-4) argue that Meng Zi refutes the internal-external
distinction and does not argue for the internality of yi. It is unlikely that Meng Zi’s attitude to this
distinction is a total rejection, even if he is dissatisfied with Gao Zi’s and Meng Jizi’s way to talk about
internality and externality. In 6A6 he explicitly says that the virtues are “not welded to us externally 非
由外鑠我也.”
5
Among the interpreters who understand yi in terms of appropriateness or fittingness, Kwong-loi Shun
shows a tendency to specify what kind of standards yi actions are supposed to fit. For him, yi “as an
ethical attribute of a person has to do with a firm commitment to ethical standards” (Shun 1997, 62). I
think the term “ethical standards” is still too general. All virtues by definition lead to actions that are
appropriate according to ethical standards. To say that yi is a commitment to acting according to ethical
standards interprets yi as an all-encompassing virtue, making us wonder why other virtues are still needed.
4
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Based on Meng Zi’s claim that “the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning
of yi,” Bryan Van Norden states that yi “is a disposition to disdain or regard as shameful
certain character traits and the actions that would be characteristic of them” (Van
Norden 2007, 270). Van Norden indicates that here the tendency to disdain or to regard
as shameful should not be understood in the conventional sense; rather, it is a
disposition to have an unpleasant feeling when one recognizes the character flaws of
their own or of those with whom they identify and to have appropriate emotional and
behavioral reactions to this recognition. (Van Norden 2002, 52) This view is challenged
in less moralized readings offered by interpreters like Jane Geaney (2004) and Seok
(2017). There is no space to examine the details of their disagreements. But at least two
lacunae can be found in the moralistic reading. First, not in all instances of shame the
agent has appropriate emotional or behavioral reactions (3B7, 2A9). Secondly, not all
instances of shame are triggered by the recognition of character flaws (1A5, 4A8, 2A7).
In my view, the feeling of shame in the Meng-Zi is no more than shame in general
– the negative feeling toward oneself after one’s inferiority in some aspect is exposed
through the attitudes of an other. Such exposure happens when the agent perceives a
discrepancy between her self-regard and an other’s evaluation of her. The “other” can
be actual or imagined, and the latter paves the way to the development of an
intrapsychic moral authority. The tendency to feel shame contributes to the
demarcation of a moral dimension of life that informs the agent about what is truly base
and to avoid, but it does not alone constitute the dispositional core of yi. Meng Zi
insightfully claims shame to be only the “beginning” (duan 端) of yi, not yi itself. Not
only an unmoralized sense of shame (like the shame over one’s poverty) but also a
moralized one is inadequate as the motivational core of yi actions. A yi person may
have a heightened repugnance to the defects in her character, but this sensitivity should
not be what typically motivates her to act in yi ways. For one thing, insofar as she is a
yi person already, she should not have numerous enough character defects to trigger
her yi motives so that she acts frequently in yi ways. For another, in many circumstances,
the concern about one’s character is the wrong kind of reason to qualify an action as
virtuous. There seems to be something particularly other-regarding in the virtue of yi
that goes beyond the concern for one’s own moral status.
In sum, both approaches discussed above capture only part of what yi consists in:
the first approach grasps the context-sensitivity of this virtue, but is too thin to
distinguish this virtue from acting properly in a general way and leaves unsaid the
characteristic feelings that constitute a yi motive. The second approach specifies what
mentality this virtue requires, but confines the characteristic feelings of yi to a too
moralized understanding of shame. As I will argue below, both fail to pay enough
attention to the reliance of yi on a social scheme as the general regulation of behavior
to receive its content. In the next section, I will lay out the two faceted-structure of yi
by examining different usages of the term “yi” in the Meng-Zi. This structure calls for
a more rigorous analysis of Meng Zi’s moral psychology to identify the dispositional
Insofar as Meng Zi bothers to name different virtues, more needs to be said to distinguish yi from other
virtues. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to Shun’s account.
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core of yi, and that can be done by looking into a relatively ignored emotion in the
Meng-Zi – respect.
2. TWO FACES OF YI IN THE MENG-ZI
One difficulty to fully analyze yi in the Mengzian context is due to the structure of yi.
On the one hand, yi has an intimate relationship with both the physiopsychological
factor of qi (2A2) and one’s inborn tendencies to feel, and thus is treated as a disposition.
On the other hand, yi is involved in the discussion of the social order which determines
the correct way to conduct a wide range of activities from getting married to taking
governmental positions.6 In several instances, the latter aspect of yi is so prominent that
yi is paralleled with the term ritual (li 禮) which relates to a codified norm specifying
proper behaviors. In the rest of this section, I offer textual evidence to illustrate the two
aspects of yi, and suggest that yi as a disposition has abiding by norms as a component.7
Yi as A Disposition
In many places “yi” refers to an aspect of personality. In 4B19, Meng Zi praises Shun’s
acting out of benevolent and yi intentions instead of simply following the requirements
of benevolence and yi. That is to say, a truly yi person as Shun is, when acting in a yi
way, expresses a genuinely yi intention, rather than following rules in the purely
behavioral sense. In 7B37, Meng Zi says he hates slyness (ning 佞), here apparently a
vicious disposition, which sometimes is confused with yi. In 4B5, 1A7, and 3B9, yi is
paralleled with the character trait of benevolence, a virtue rooted in one’s
compassionate heart. As a quality of one’s personality, yi can be possessed by a person,
and it brings to the possessor joy (4A27, 6A17) that is not lost together with external
goods (7A9). Moreover, yi is rooted in the inborn affective capacities of humans, not
forged upon from outside (6A4, 6A5).
Yi and Norms
Yi as a disposition is only part of Meng Zi’s usage of the term. There are places where
yi is closely linked to inherited norms that coordinate relationships. For example, in
7B2, Meng Zi says that there is no yi war in the Spring and Autumn Annals, because
the norms of war stipulate a war to be rightfully waged only when a state of a higher
rank attacks its subordinate, while the wars in the Spring and Autumn Annals were
waged between states of equal rank. Here yi has nothing to do with the disposition of
any person. What yi is depends on the widely accepted rules regarding military affairs.
Not only military operations but also economic arrangements can be yi or not yi. In
3B8, when asked by a counselor whether he could wait until the next year to tax at the
proper rate, Meng Zi responds that if one sees the current taxation as not-yi, one should
not wait until the next year to stop it. In 7A33, he says that “To take something that one
6

This aspect of yi in the Meng-Zi is similar to the primary meaning of yi in the Xunzi analyzed in Hutton
1996, 2015.
7
For a philological and historical examination of the two dimensions of yi, see Jia and Kwok (2007).
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is not entitled to is not yi.” Here what yi is depends on the norms that regulate the
distribution of material goods.
Even in places where yi sounds like a disposition, it is sometimes defined in terms
of an order that specifies role-specific obligations. In 7A34, Meng Zi first admits that
the hermit Zhong Zi has limited yi since he would refuse people’s not-yi offering of a
state. But then he immediately claims Zhong Zi’s yi to be trivial, because “nothing is
greater for a human than the relations between relatives, ruler, and minister, or
superiors and inferiors.” By refusing to fulfill his familial duties and the duty of a
scholar-official, Zhong Zi loses the greater yi. In 3A4, Meng Zi says that it was the
common yi of the world (tian-xia-zhi-tong-yi 天下之通義) that the people laboring with
their hearts govern the people laboring with their strength. The “common yi” seems to
refer to an overarching framework of the division of labor in which the whole human
community is organized. In 1A3, Meng Zi says that to realize the Kingly Way, the ruler
should provide education and advocate the yi of filial piety and brotherliness. Here yi
seems to refer to the norm specifying role-specific duties in familial life.8 In those
examples, yi relates to a certain norm, order, or model that entails obligations. It has
less to do with the disposition to feel and to be motivated in a certain way than with
duty-entailing norms; it is something that can be violated (fan 犯) like punitive laws
(4A1).
The norms presumed by yi in the instances cover norms of different kinds:
economic policy (3B8), norms on military and diplomatic matters (7B2), on property
(7A33), social order (3A4), and familial duties (1A3). From today’s perspective, those
norms look so heterogeneous that one may doubt whether yi is simply the state of affairs
in a well-governed society. Yet I think one feature shared by the norms presumed by
those instances of yi is that they specify widely recognized role-specific duties backed
up by established schemes.9 Given that the early Chinese society is permeated by the
regulation of rituals, to a large extent the norms presumed by yi overlap with rituals.
Indeed, the binomial term of li-yi (禮義) appears no less frequently than benevolence
and yi (ren-yi 仁義) in the Meng-Zi (1A7, 7B12, 1B16, passim).10 When asked about
how his refusal to meet with the various lords is yi, Meng Zi offers examples of ancient
worthy people refusing to meet certain lords because they were not ministers. The

8

The text is 謹庠序之教，申之以孝悌之義。The yi here can also mean “meaning”, but unlikely so,
since it should not be a problem for a competent user of the Chinese language at that time to identify
what the terms “filial piety” and “brotherliness” mean. What needs to be taught or advocated are the
obligations entailed by filial piety and brotherliness.
9
I want to emphasize that “established schemes” are indispensable. It is tempting to think that a person's
place in a relationship alone determines her duty in that relationship. But in most cases, it is not the
relationship per se, but the socially recognized (sometimes legally sanctioned) norm regulating that
relationship that determines one’s duty in it. For instance, in many societies, children do not have the
duty to support their biological mother if the latter is not involved in any way in nurturing them. The
biological relationship of the woman and the child does not by itself entail a duty.
10
For the close association of li and yi in a larger Confucian context, see Ames 1987, 98-9.
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ancient people are yi, because their behavior conforms to the ritual that only ministers
(instead of commoners) meet the rulers (3B7).11
The Disposition of Yi Having Conformity to Norms as A Component
From the cases above we can see that some references of “yi” involve norms that
regulate collective life. Then how does this aspect of yi relate to yi as a disposition?
One option is to view a person’s being yi or not-yi as totally dependent on whether they
constantly act according to norms; yi as a disposition is parasitic to norms.
Yet this understanding of yi encounters two interpretative difficulties. First, it
cannot explain in what way yi as the propensity to be subject to norms is “internal” to
human nature as Meng Zi so rigorously argued. In 6A5, he states that external rules
determine the way in which one’s respect is expressed. Just like the external
environment (summer or winter) indicates what to drink to quench one’s thirst (cool
water or hot broth) but the need to drink is from human physicality, norms determine
the way to express one’s emotion, but there needs to be an emotion to be expressed in
the first place to qualify an action as virtuous.
11

Meng Zi articulates his thought primarily in terms of virtue and says less about norms of different
kinds. Regarding the relation between the norms presumed by yi (“yi-norms” below) and ritual norms, I
have two clarifications:
First, I do not take the yi-norms and rituals as norms regulating different spheres of life like legal codes
and etiquette in our society. A set of yi-norms and a set of ritual norms may regulate the same sphere of
social life (like in 6A5). They differ in their codifiability and concreteness. Yi-norms are uncodifiable
and in many circumstances need the codifiable rituals to be carried out. For example, yi requires a
minister to assist the ruler to govern well. Ritual specifies the concrete manners for a minister to do that:
how to speak in the court, what style to use in paperwork, how to accept or decline a position, etc. Given
the penetration of ritual in all relationships in early China, the distinction between yi-norms and ritual is
more in concept than in practice. The execution of role-specific duties is more often than not regulated
by ritual. Hence the frequent parallel of li-yi mentioned above.
Secondly, it is tempting to say that rituals are conventional codes to be disregarded when more
important values are in danger (e.g., 4A17), while yi is overriding and should never be compromised
(e.g., 6A10, see Shun 1997, 57 for this view). However, remarks like 4B6 complicates the issue. 4B6
says: “a great person will not engage in ‘propriety’ that is not propriety, or ‘yi’ that is not yi 非禮之禮，
非義之義，大人弗為.” By “‘propriety’ that is not propriety”, perhaps Meng Zi means actions that have
external conformity to ritual codes but are against the value supposed to be protected or expressed by
those codes (e.g., refusing to touch one's drowning sister-in-law is against the idea of giving due
treatment, including cherishing her life, to one's sister-in-law). A great person should not do that. If that
is the case, by “‘yi’ that is not yi”, in a parallel way, Meng Zi means that behaviors that conform to yinorms (e.g., a minister defending one’s ruler) may be against the value that the relevant yi-norm is
supposed to protect or express (e.g., defending the Tyrant Zhou against King Wen is against the value
that the yi of a minister should promote – good governance). If this reading is correct, 4B6 implies that
in extreme cases yi-norms can also be overridden.
The last point leads to the question of what exactly is the value that undergirds yi-norms. Unfortunately,
Meng Zi does not have a direct answer. His two versions of the origin story of social order, 3A4 and
3B9, are both told in very broad strokes and serve more local purposes. There is no space to attend to
the details of them, but I think one message (though not the central message) conveyed by them is that
norms are established to promote a peaceful and prosperous livelihood for humans by meeting their
physical and social needs.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for requiring me to make the clarifications.
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Secondly, understanding yi as parasitic to norms ignores the rich materials in the
Meng-Zi about a cluster of sentiments involved in the disposition of yi – the respectful
sentiments. Besides 6A5, there are other passages linking yi and respectful
sentiments. 12 In 7A15 Meng Zi says definitively that “revering one’s elders is yi.”
When specifying the ideal of the five relations, he says “Between ruler and ministers
there is yi” (3A4) and in 2B2, Jingzi (with whom he agrees on this point) says that
“ruler and minister emphasize reverence” – the expression of reverence marks the yi
between ruler and minister. Such frequent parallels suggest that the agent’s feeling
certain respectful sentiment is characteristic for yi motives.
Those materials call for a more nuanced account of the mental state that undergirds
yi motives. Meng Zi uses different terms – respect (gong 恭 ), reverence (jing 敬 ),
esteem (zun 尊 ), honor (gui 貴 ), and to follow (cong 從 ) – to denote the attitudes
constitutive to yi motives. For my over-arching purpose, I use “respect” as an umbrella
term to refer to those respectful sentiments. I am not interested in differentiating one’s
respectful feeling toward one’s elder brother and that toward one’s ruler. Rather, I aim
to portray what for Meng Zi is the right kind of mentality behind one’s voluntary
following of social norms. Respect is not the only emotion involved in yi. After
discussing respect, I will briefly explain the relationship between respect and shame,
and show how they together constitute the psychological core of yi.
3. YI AND RESPECT IN THE MENG-ZI
Compared with other emotional capacities like the tendencies to feel commiseration
and shame, the capacity for respect receives relatively less attention. Yet helpful
discussions exist. Discussing respect and ritual propriety in early Confucianism, Sinyee Chan understands respect as “a serious frame of mind” that can have both persons
and inanimate objects (Heaven, ceremonies, one’s duties) as its object (Chan 2006,
229). Following Chan, Pengbo Liu proposes what he calls an “inside-out model” to
understand respect. For him, Confucian respect is “rooted in certain virtuous attitudes
and dispositions that constitute one’s general way of dealing with the world and one’s
own place in it. Specifically, these attitudes and dispositions include, but are not limited
to, seriousness, caution, modesty, etc.” (Liu 2019, 54). I am in line with their reading.
Yet more needs to be said about respect to distinguish it from other attitudes that also
involve seriousness, caution, and modesty, such as sincerity (cheng 誠) or awe (wei 畏).
Furthermore, I think a distinction should be made between respect in Confucius (孔子)’
and Xun Zi’s thought and respect in the Meng-Zi: for the former respect sometimes
have inanimate beings as the object, for the latter respect is almost always toward a

12

It is noteworthy that the sentiments involved in yi are also the paradigmatic feelings associated with
ritual propriety, but by now this should not surprise us, since we have seen that yi and ritual are
intertwined for Meng Zi.
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person, which can be seen in Chan’s own textual survey (ibid, 232).13 The personoriented feature of Mengzian respect is captured by Myeong-seok Kim who
understands it as “an emotional sensibility responsive to “(1) a person’s worth as a
person, (2) a person’s worth deriving from his social status or his role in society, and
(3) a person’s merit due to his ethical or political accomplishment” (Kim 2014, 244). I
concur with Kim in taking Mengzian respect as a responsive attitude toward other
persons, but as Liu rightfully observes, in Confucian respect, “no special emphasis is
given to the inherent properties of persons as such… properties of [respect’s] objects
are highly relevant to how to appropriately express [respect] in a given context” (Liu
2019, 54). Following Chan and Liu, I take Mengzian respect as a mental state that
manifests seriousness and caution but is not dependent on any universally observed
properties in each individual; following Kim, I take it as person-responsive. My view
is a synthesis of theirs: precisely because Mengzian respect is person-responsive but
not responsive to universal properties like rationality, it calls for established norms to
specify the features of particular persons to respect. In what follows, I argue that the
definitive content of Mengzian respect is the attitude of prioritizing and serving
(Section 3.1). Because respect involves the propensity to serve, its expression calls for
the application of rules so that the proper way to serve can be discerned (Section 3.2).
3.1

RESPECT: A PROPENSITY TO PRIORITIZE BY SERVICE

Meng Zi does not define respect. But the instances of respect in the text show that it
involves subjecting oneself by prioritizing another person and almost always motivates
the agent to serve and honor that person.14 In 4A2, he says, “One who does not serve
one’s ruler in the manner that Shun served Yao does not revere one’s ruler.” In 4A1,
when explaining the yi in serving a ruler, he says, “To be demanding of one’s ruler is
what is called being respectful. To display what is good and inhibit what is bad is called
13

The only place where jing refers to a serious frame of mind toward impersonal being is 5A6: “Qi was
worthy and capable of reverently continuing the Way of Yu 啓賢，能敬承繼禹之道.” But even here
there is a personal element: what Qi reveres is the way of the eminent person Yu.
The distinction between respect for persons and reverence as a general frame of mind is especially
important because it pertains to a distinction between Mengzian respect and the Neo-Confucian
reverence anchored in a deep appreciation of principle or pattern (li 理). Stephen Angle argues that NeoConfucian reverence consists in “attending single-mindedly to a particular thing or matter before one, in
all of its distinctness” including “being aware of the interdependence of that thing or matter with its
entire context” (Angle 2009, 154). In my view, Mengzian respect may be compatible with the
metaphysical assumptions of Neo-Confucians but does not presume or require them. It is worth exploring
in a different work how respect for persons relates to facing the cosmos with solemnity.
14
The purpose of the following two sections is to understand the idea of respect. I will draw on examples
from passages about both yi and ritual propriety. I do not think this confuses those two virtues. Two
virtues may share the same mode of feeling as one component of each and differ in other aspects. For
example, both parental love and friendship involve affectionate care but they differ in aspects such as
that the former has a level of indulgence and sense of responsibility that the latter lacks. Indeed, it is
implausible to assume that virtues and feelings have a strict one-to-one relationship. A full examination
of ritual propriety is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say here that it does not involve the
concern about one’s character that yi requires.
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being reverent.” In those cases, respecting the ruler means serving him by carrying out
the duties of a minister so that the ruler rules well.
Respecting one’s family members also involves service. In 5B4 Meng Zi praises
Shun’s honoring his father (zun-qin 尊親) by serving him: “In being a filial son, nothing
is greater than honoring one’s relatives. In honoring one’s relatives, nothing is greater
than caring for them with the world.” In 4A27 and 7A15, he defines yi as “following
(cong 從) one’s brother” and “revering one’s brother” (7A15) respectively. A sort of
submission to the elders is exhibited in yi motives.
It should be noticed that although cong is sometimes translated as “obedience,” the
submission Meng Zi has in mind is not an absolute one that demands the elimination
of the agent’s will. Cong’s literal meaning is “to follow” and “to go behind.” It can
refer to the behavior of obeying someone’s order, but in the Meng-Zi it appears
frequently in describing people’s attitudes in addition to or even instead of behavior.
Moreover, cong appears in relationships less antagonistic than the word “obedience”
implies – one in which a person’s will prevails and the other succumbs. In 6A7 Meng
Zi assumes that in terms of flavor, all people’s tastes cong the famous chef Yi Ya,
which cannot mean that they obey Yi Ya regardless of their own will. Rather, people
appreciate Yi Ya’s taste of cuisine and take his judgment as authoritative. In 2A2 Meng
Zi says that sages will cong what he says if they arise again.15 In 3A2, quoting the
Records of Rites he asks people to “cong the ancestors” in mourning and sacrifice. In
1B15 and 5A6 he uses cong to describe people following the sage king. In 2A8 he
praises Shun to have “put himself aside and cong others.”16
A shared aspect of those diverse usages of cong is to accredit significance to
someone by giving them (and their opinions and claims) priority in consideration.
Regarding good teachings, one’s attitude is to follow and incorporate them into one’s
own behavior; regarding good people, to associate with them and recognize their
authority in practical judgment. If asked, the attitude of cong can be backed up by
reasons. In the ideal Confucian family, the elder brother is the model whom the younger
can imitate. The maturity of the elder brother qualifies him as an exemplar for the
younger. Thus the younger brother, reaching a certain age, would recognize that
“between elder and younger there is precedence” and prioritize his elder brother in the
supposedly ritually regulated family life. This does not mean that the younger brother
can never oppose the elder. Meng Zi’s description of the respectful attitude of the
younger, as most of his other descriptive and normative sayings, is not a direct
injunction of action. After all, Meng Zi praises the Duke of Zhou for correcting his
mistake in trusting his elder brother Guan Shu who revolted (2B9). What gets praised
15

For other places where cong is used as following instructions or an instructor, see 6B14, 7A32, 7A41.
For literal uses of cong, see 1B4 (“To cong the current down and forget to return is what is meant by
‘drifting.’ To cong the current up and forget to return is what is meant by ‘reversing’.”) and 4A24, 25,
4B30, 31, 33, 5A2, 6A8, 6A16, 6B6, 7B26. Cong can also mean “to chase” (3A3). The term “cong-zhe
從者”, “people who cong”, can mean “attendant” (3B4) or “follower” in the sense of following another’s
teaching (7B30). Perhaps not all usages of cong are relevant to Meng Zi's specification of the mentality
of yi. But by listing such diverse use of the term I want to show that cong is not “obedience” in its most
common usage today.
16
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there is the duke’s correcting his mistakes by attacking and punishing Guan Shu. In this
case, no obedience whatsoever is mentioned. Submission is part of the mentality of
following, but not in the sense of eliminating one’s will.17 When indicating that yi is to
cong one’s brother, Meng Zi is illustrating the respectful mentality involved rather than
defining the behavioral aspect of yi.
It is tempting to think that respect is necessarily felt by an inferior toward a superior
in a hierarchical relationship with social rank being the only determinative factor of
one’s respectability. But the text shows that multiple properties in persons call for
respect. Meng Zi lists three such properties: “At court, nothing is better than rank. In
the village, nothing is better than age. In assisting the world and nurturing the people,
nothing is better than Virtue.” (2B2) In different spheres of social life, different
standards of respectability apply. Those standards can intersect with each other. In 5B3
Meng Zi illustrates several cases of the “esteeming the prestigious” (zun-xian 尊賢,
those of lower rank respecting those of the higher rank due to their status) and
“respecting the worthy” (gui-gui 貴貴, the high-rank officials respecting the worthy
due to their competence and virtue) happening simultaneously. 18 The yi in such
respectful treatments, as Meng Zi says, is “one.” Every society is norm-laden and has
established rules to regulate relationships. What features are relevant in respecting
persons and how persons should be respected depend on what such norms say. Hence
the second feature of Mengzian respect: it requires definite norms to regulate its
expression.
3.2

RESPECT AS A MOTIVATIONAL SENTIMENT CALLING
FOR ACTION IN ACCORD WITH NORMS

In addition to being a “frame of mind” or a mere mood, respect in the Meng-Zi is
associated with motives to treat others in a certain way. In 7A37, Meng Zi says, “To
care for someone without respecting him is to treat him like a pet,” and indicates that
“empty ‘respect’ without actuality (shi 實) cannot ensnare a gentleman.” In the context
of the Warring States period, “actuality” involves giving gifts appropriate to the status
of the person according to ritual and offering him governmental positions according to
his ability (see 5B3). In 5B4 Meng Zi says that when receiving a gift from someone of
an honorable rank, it is disrespectful to examine whether the giver obtains the gift in a
yi or not-yi way. As long as the presenting and acceptance of gifts are in accordance
with ritual, the gift should be received.
This is surprising considering Meng Zi’s concern about one’s integrity and
uprightness. Why a careful examination before receiving a gift is disrespectful? If
something is obtained in a wrong, or even merely questionable way, isn’t it better to
17

Indeed, understanding cong as obedience creates an internal tension in the text. Chen Daqi (2016)
believes that for Meng Zi cong-xiong means to “obey (聽從，遵從) one’s elder brother”. Understanding
cong this way, he wonders how, while the core of yi is to obey (one’s elder brother) but the yi toward
one’s ruler is to rectify, thus not obey, him. (40-1) My interpretation of cong avoids this difficulty.
18
From this case we can see that respect for Meng Zi is mutual even in the strictly hierarchical
relationships like between a duke and commoner.
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refuse it to maintain one’s integrity? Instead of refusal, Meng Zi recommends a mindset
of deferring and giving priority to others: in normal social interactions, to take oneself
as entitled with the authority to judge other people’s moral status is disrespectful; it is
arrogant to put oneself in such imagined authority. Even though he thinks many people
in his time do get involved in not-yi due to a detrimental social regime, for him, the
right way to deal with the situation is not to break social rules, but to reform not-yi
practices while staying within the norm as a larger whole. As he says in 5B9, yi is the
path and ritual is the door. They provide reliable guidance for people to figure out how
to express the proper attitude to others. Even Confucius, when reforming the society,
does not take the risk of abandoning such rules.
Put into the context in which yi is linked to various norms to express respect, the
otherwise thin and uninformative aspect of yi – yi as appropriateness – becomes
illuminating. For Meng Zi, the way to reach that appropriateness is to follow the norms
that specify role-specific obligations widely accepted by the members in the
community. In the case of parents, it is caring and supporting; in the case of rulers,
honest advice; in the case of a scholar-official with whom one associates, exchanging
gifts in accord with his status.
Note that Meng Zi’s view should be distinguished from any rule-fetishism that
takes rules as unconditionally binding. When the other side in a relation refuses to
regulate her behavior by the socially accepted rules, the agent no longer has the
obligation to abide by those rules. In 4B3 King Xuan of Qi speaks of the ritual that a
minister should wear mourning clothes for a deceased ruler, complaining implicitly that
people no longer do that in his time. Meng Zi responds that if the ruler does not treat
the minister properly (putting the minister’s admonitions into effect, listening to his
teachings, assisting his trips, etc.) but on the contrary keeps obstructing the minister’s
work, the ruler does not deserve to be treated in accordance with ritual. Rules are not
to be followed unconditionally.
In sum, Mengzian respect is the tendency to prioritize others in a relationship by
serving and honoring them according to the norms accepted to regulate their
relationship. As part of the psychological core of the disposition yi, it is inborn to
human nature but calls for established rules to provide guidance regarding what specific
treatment is owed to the respected.
3.3

RESPECT, SHAME, AND YI AS A VIRTUE

The previous account of yi is compatible with pictures of yi drawn based on the other
feeling that Meng Zi links to yi, shame. Mengzian shame and respect are closely
connected, if not textually, at least phenomenologically, since both feelings involves
the sensitivity to the significance of others and the negation of self-assertiveness.19
Think of what defects of character may be involved in someone who commits not-yi
by transgressing a norm. Not bothering to take heed of what is required in a relationship,
they fail to respect the relevant persons in that relationship. They do not take seriously
19

Shun (2013) also notices this.
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other people’s claims on them – the claims that they should regulate their behavior by
the shared norms as everyone else in the community. The disrespect shown in the
nonperformance of one’s duty entails an inadequate sense of shame. By ignoring the
duty that community members expect them to fulfill, the not-yi person rejects the
community members’ status as stakeholders entitled to evaluate her, for their
prospective attitudes, the indignation or disdain that the non-performance of duty
would incur, do not feature in the not-yi person’s self-evaluation. This is disrespectful
since it is a symbolic communication that those attitudes do not count. It is at the same
time shameless, since the not-yi person has an impenetrable self-conception that refuses
to internalize the negative feelings toward them.
The connection between respect and shame is due to the structures of both. The
feeling of shame is by nature intersubjective – feeling shame involves responding to
the attitudes of others with a self-conception in mind. Such a response presumes some
significance of others that the agent has to attend to. The feeling of shame has as a part
of it the recognition of such significance by yielding to other people’s expectations and
demands, namely, Mengzian respect. Just as the ability to feel shame presumes some
minimum yielding – some willingness to render oneself susceptible to the attitudes of
others, the feeling of respect for Meng Zi involves prioritizing the other and thus
“lowering” oneself.20 In recognizing the significance of others by putting oneself under
their evaluation, the agent makes herself vulnerable to the potential harm that their
attitudes can inflict on her self-regard. The capacity to respect is rooted in the sense of
shame.
In sum, Mengzian yi as a virtue consists in accrediting significance to other persons
and responding to such significance by subjecting oneself to them in ways specified by
the social norms. Yi is preconditioned by a sense of shame as sensitivity to the attitudes
of others toward oneself and instantiated in voluntarily submitting oneself to the norms
that specify the due treatment of others and oneself. By showing respect through the
pertinent norms, a yi person protects her status against disdain. Respect for persons and
the sense of shame mutually undergird each other and together constitute the
psychological core of yi.
4. RULE-RELATED VIRTUES
AND ACTION-GUIDING IN VIRTUE ETHICS
My concern so far is interpretative. To conclude my discussion, I explore the
significance of the Mengzian account of yi for contemporary virtue ethics: it shows a
way to incorporate rule-conformity without giving up the central virtue ethical
commitment – to account for the standard of morality in terms of the inner state of the
agent. Giving due attention to established norms, virtue ethics would be more capable
of guiding actions in practical life. My remarks below will be preliminary, and from
20

This aspect of respect is captured by Liu who observes that by advocating respect, Confucians “remind
us of the existence of potential sources of values, reasons, or most generally, considerations outside
ourselves, which we, given our natural tendency of self-importance, tend to neglect, or at any rate fail to
take seriously enough” (Liu 2019, 56).
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now on I discuss from a virtue ethical perspective. That is to say, I presume that
constructive work in virtue ethics is worth doing without defending the validity and
merits of virtue ethics against other normative theories.
To begin with, virtue ethics has been proposed as a radical departure from other
ethical theories as it argues that character traits, not actions, are the primary object of
moral evaluation. This approach is accused of being unable to guide actions since it
replaces all questions of what action one should take with the question of what kind of
person one should be. To see the problem, let’s look at a standard of right action
proposed by Rosalind Hursthouse: “an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent
would characteristically do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse 1999, 18). This thesis
looks unproblematic as a theory of right action. If a prosecutor prosecutes a defendant
out of malice, although he is not virtuous, he does the right thing. 21 According to
Hursthouse’s view, the rightness of his action comes from his doing what a virtuous
person would characteristically do, but his character is defective because he is not
motivated in a way in which a virtuous person is characteristically motivated.22
But it is hard to see how this standard of right action can help a non-virtuous agent
deliberate what to do. A virtuous person (by definition) reaches the right conclusion,
spontaneously or after deliberation. Virtues of character and practical wisdom (here
understood broadly as the capacity to weigh and measure the relevant goods correctly)
coordinate with each other and lead to a decision attuned to the particular situation.
Such ability, however, is not available to the not-yet-virtuous mind. Without being
virtuous or surrounded by virtuous exemplars, one simply does not know what a
virtuous person would do in her situation. When formulating a theory of right action
we can refer to what a virtuous person would characteristically do, presuming accounts
of that are available. But in practical life, when an agent needs to deliberate, she is often
puzzled, confused, or struggling. Deliberation – what a virtuous person would
characteristically do when facing a tricky situation – does not lead to the right action
for a non-virtuous agent.
To respond to this challenge, Hursthouse argues that ideas of virtues and vices
generate prescriptions and prohibitions – what she calls “v-rules” – such as “do what
is honest, charitable, generous” and “do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, mean”
(ibid, 36). Her account, however, is not clear about the status of the v-rules and how
they feature in the practical deliberation of mature moral agents. As Eric Hutton points
out, she introduces the v-rules mainly as a method of educating children, and does not
mention them in her key discussion of the virtuous person’s deliberation (Hutton 2015,
21

This example is taken from Sidgwick by Michael Slote (2001).
There are other views on the standard of right action. Slote (2001) argues that a right action is an action
motivated by virtuous intentions (so the prosecutor in the example above acts wrongly). Svensson (2011)
argues that virtue ethics should not focus on the right action. Swanton (2001, 2003) develops a view that
shifts the attention from the inner state of agents to the effects of character traits so as to make room for
right actions in the concept of virtue. I choose Hursthouse’s formulation because (1) it retains a commonsensical way to evaluate actions (i.e., the prosecutor acts rightly but for bad reasons), and (2) as an
account of right action it is formal. Hursthouse launches it together with a eudaimonistic understanding
of virtue, but the account itself can be used as a standard of right action with the standard of virtue
otherwise construed. I will say more about Swanton’s approach below in footnote 25.
22
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120). Furthermore, the v-rules still look quite general to me. They seem to include rules
of different kinds. Among them, there are rules whose application is highly flexible and
a single infringement of which has a relatively small impact on the rightness of an
action and the goodness of an agent: to be a generous person I should do what is
generous, like giving five dollars to the soup kitchen. But if I do not, I am not doing
anything wrong and may still remain an overall generous person if I am willing to help
others often enough. In some other cases, however, rule-following has a greater sway
on our moral evaluation. Think of a bookkeeper who presses hard questions to the
manager to examine the company’s financial statements. Even when behaving with all
due respect, she may look uncharitable, demanding, and obnoxiously detail-oriented.
But she is not; instead, she is careful, upright, and honest as a bookkeeper fulfilling the
requirements of her profession. Rules in such cases count more than rules in the
generosity case. By giving them due weight, we offer reliable practical suggestions to
morally mediocre people in spheres of life where rule-abidingness is the primary rightmaking feature of an action.
Appealing to rules looks a dangerous move for virtue ethics. The gist of virtue
ethics is to account for moral values in terms of virtues independently from other
measurements of value (rule-conformity or utility for instance). To recommend people
to rely on rules instead of moral exemplars looks like reducing virtue to rule-conformity,
which reminds us of the lamentable image of a bureaucrat heartlessly following rules.
I think such difficulty arises because when illustrating their theory, virtue ethicists tend
to focus on virtues which are basically modes of feeling plus some discretion of
practical wisdom (e.g., benevolence, generosity, courage).23 When accounting for right
actions, they tend to appeal to the same set of virtues and let the rarely possessed
practical wisdom do most of the deliberative work. If a different set of virtues, virtues
that have rule-conformity as a component, are at their disposal, it would be easier for
them to recommend the agent to figure out and abide by established rules where they
are available without giving up the virtue ethical commitment. 24 The practical
recommendation, ultimately speaking, is still to do what a virtuous person would
characteristically do, but the virtues involved here require the agent to follow the
pertinent rules.25
23

Hursthouse explicitly refuses to discuss justice and rights because in her eyes those vague concepts
are less helpful than concrete virtues (1999, 6). To me, this is an unfortunate move where she misses the
opportunity to discuss a set of most action-guiding virtues. Putting aside rights, justice as a virtue has
been elaborated by generations of thinkers from Aristotle. If it looks vague, it is precisely because it
presumes a social, legal, and political framework as a general scheme of action to which Hursthouse’s
version of virtue ethics does not pay much attention.
24
In extreme situations, rules should be overridden, but only a fully virtuous person has the required
wisdom to decide correctly when to break rules. Here we are talking about non-virtuous people who do
not possess practical wisdom of that level. Furthermore, practically speaking, the more prevalent
problem in our moral behavior is not that we stick to rules too rigidly but that we are tempted to break
rules when we should follow them.
25
This is to say that by highlighting the merits of the Meng Zi-inspired rule-related virtues I am not
providing an alternative to Hursthouse’s standard. I am emphasizing the significant role played by social
norms that determine our role-specific duties.
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The Mengzian account of yi presents a promising way to characterize that set of
virtues – what I call rule-related virtues. The two-faceted structure of Mengzian yi
strikes a delicate balance between the emphasis on the inner state of the agent and the
attention paid to the schemes of action determined by institutions and conventions. Its
rule-related aspect stresses the significance of social norms in guiding behaviors. Its
dispositional aspect maintains the priority of the inner state of the agent by insisting
that to qualify as yi, an action should be an expression of one’s respectful feelings and
the sensitivity of the demands of others. Many rules that Meng Zi takes for granted do
not apply to other societies. But the structure of yi can be used to characterize rulerelated virtues in a modern society such as justice, accountability (in team or
organizations with regulatory frameworks), loyalty (to business partners), courtesy, etc.
In this kind of virtue, the salient norms play the major right-making role in actions. For
example, loyalty to business partners involves a certain amount of commitment to
individuals just like loyalty in interpersonal relationships, but it has more to do with
norms in the business in question such as information transparency, technology sharing,
the adoption of protectionist strategies against rivals. Equipped with thick descriptions
of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics is more ready to guide actions for non-virtuous
agents: they (in fact, we) are recommended to follow the established rules where they
are available.
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Another promising virtue ethical account of right action is from Christian Swanton. According to her
target-centered theory, “an action is virtuous in respect V if and only if it hits the target of virtue V,” and
“an action is right if and only if it is overall virtuous” (Swanton 2003, 228). Much could be said about
this account, for the sake of space, I confine my discussion to the following point: This account would
work if the targets of virtues could be specified, but I doubt if Swanton’s theory of virtue has enough
resources to do so. The specification of the targets of virtues eventually needs to appeal to the concept
of virtue, which in Swanton’s theory is “a good quality of character …to respond to, or acknowledge,
items within its field in an excellent or good enough way” (ibid, 19, italics added). But what counts as
“excellent or good enough”? Is the hatred of humanity strong enough to motivate the prosecutor to
prosecute the defendant but not strong enough to murder him good enough? How about certain
obsessive-compulsive disorder that can do the same motivating work? I suspect that to answer such a
question, we are led to the idea of flourishing that Swanton wants to do away with. I owe my thanks to
an anonymous reviewer for suggesting me to make this clarification.
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